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I. INTRODUCTION
The misuse defense is a deadly weapon which may render a valid
patent or copyright unenforceable. The doctrine of patent misuse was
originally developed to prevent enforcement of a patent that was
against public policy. In spite of the sound rationale, application of the
misuse doctrine can lead to unreasonable results. For example, it may
aid an infringer who makes or sells a patented product without having
been granted a license.
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds1 illustrates this disadvanta-
geous side of the misuse doctrine. In Lasercomb, it was undisputed that
Reynolds copied Lasercomb's computer-assisted die-making software,
thus willfully infringing its copyright. The court would have readily
rendered a judgment for Lasercomb if its standard license agreement
had not included clauses that prevented its licensees from developing
computer-assisted die-making software. Solely for the reason that the
license agreement included such restrictive clauses, the Court of Ap-
peals granted the defendant's misuse defense and denied the plaintiff
the remedy for copyright infringement. It did not analyze the effects of
the allegedly restrictive arrangement to determine whether they were
beneficial or anticompetitive. As a result, the court released the de-
fendants, who were willful infringers, from copyright infringement lia-
bility and punished the copyright owner by declaring its copyright
unenforceable.
Congress has recognized this harsh treatment of patent owners. It
limited the scope of the patent misuse doctrine by enacting the 1988
Patent Misuse Reform Act.2 The enactment of the Patent Misuse Re-
form Act reflected Congress' deep concerns with the alleged evil effect
of antitrust laws on American competitiveness. The Patent Misuse Re-
form Act introduced new limitations to abolish the problems of the
traditional misuse doctrine. Such problems include the difficulties that
patentees and copyright owners face in arguing that their licensing
practices are justified once the court has declared an illegal extension of
a patent or copyright monopoly. Courts held that the actual anticompe-
titive impact was irrelevant to make out a misuse defense. In other
words, the patentee could not raise any argument once the court held
that the patentee's conduct constituted misuse.
However, the Patent Misuse Reform Act is silent about whether
the new limitation applies to practices other than tying and package li-
censing, or whether it also applies to copyright licensing practices.
Thus, even if Lasercomb had been filed after the enactment of the Pat-
ent Misuse Reform Act, it is not clear that the court would have ex-
1. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1986).
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tended the new limitations to Lasercomb's license agreement, though
the application of the new limitations obviously could have led to a
more well-reasoned conclusion.
Therefore, this Article examines the decisional history that shaped
the misuse doctrine and the interplay between the misuse defense and
antitrust liability in patent and copyright infringement litigation. In
particular, by examining the public interest and policy considerations
underlying patent and antitrust laws, this Article compares and evalu-
ates the new view that misuse must be analyzed by the conventional an-
titrust theories expressed by Judge Posner in USM Corp. v. SPS
Technologies Inc.3 and the traditional view that was derived from the
equity doctrine expressed in Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger.4
Furthermore, this Article reviews the legislative history and the
impact on the existing common law to see to what extent the new limi-
tations apply. This Article also criticizes the Lasercomb court's applica-
tion of the traditional view and concludes that the court should have
extended the new limitations in the Patent Misuse Reform Act to eval-
uate the licensing practice.
II. DESCRIPTION OF CASE LAW
A. DECISIONAL HISTORY OF THE MISUSE DOCTRINE
The development of the misuse doctrine is generally divided into
two periods. The first period established a separate standard from an
antitrust standard. The second period expanded the scope of the misuse
doctrine, while moving toward the "super per se illegal" rule.5 The
transition of the courts' attitude toward allegedly restrictive licensing
practices in deciding patent misuse follows that of deciding antitrust lia-
bility. However, the courts recently removed the per se illegal rule
from antitrust issues but maintained it with respect to patent misuse is-
sues. This recent diversity between antitrust and patent misuse issues
clearly shows that the application of the per se illegal test of the tradi-
tional misuse doctrine is outdated.
The doctrine of patent misuse was originally developed in tying
cases. The traditional view of the principle underlying the patent mis-
use doctrine is best explained in Morton Salt v. G. S. Suppiger Co.6
Morton Salt involved a tying arrangement that required licensees to buy
3. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
4. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
5. Regarding the historical basis for the misuse defense and Antitrust counterclaim,
see generally Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform
Act and Noerr-Pennigton Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 175 (1989).
6. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
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unpatented salt tablets under a lease agreement of a patented machine.
The origin of the patent misuse doctrine developed by the Morton Salt
Court stems from the equity doctrine that a party seeking the aid of a
court of equity must come into court with clean hands.7 In striking
down the tying arrangement that lower courts had once legitimated,8
the Court reasoned that the grant to the inventor of the special privi-
lege of a patent monopoly reflected a policy adopted by the Constitution
and law. Thus, the holder of a patent may not use his or her patent in a
manner contrary to public policy.9 Accordingly, the Morton Salt Court
declared that the extension of the exclusive right outside the scope of
patent was contrary to public policy. The Court reasoned that such a
use of a patent should be condemned and it did so by declining to enter-
tain the suit for infringement.
Even though the Morton Salt Court clearly stated that the exten-
sion of a patent monopoly is contrary to public policy, it did not make
clear to what extent a patent holder can enjoy its patent monopoly.
Furthermore, any degree of anticompetitive effect resulting from a li-
censing practice is enough to satisfy the requirement of Morton Salt.x0
The Court also decided that an anticompetitive effect need not amount
to that necessary for an antitrust violation. In fact, the Court denied
the antitrust claim raised by the defendant but upheld the misuse de-
fense. Consequently, the Court of this period did not consider that the
extension of a patent monopoly would thus be an antitrust violation per
se.
11
In cases following Morton Salt, the United States Supreme Court
did not examine commercial benefits or necessities of a tying arrange-
ment when an accused infringer raised a misuse defense alleging the
patentee's licensing practice to be an illegal extension of a patent mo-
nopoly. Denying any arguments from the patentees, the Court simply
condemned tying arrangements on the basis of the patentee's obligation
not to use the patent beyond the limit of the grant.12 This practice
7. Id. at 492.
8. See, e.g., Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.N.Y. 1892); see generally
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04[1][a], (Supp. 1991).
9. 314 U.S. at 491.
10. Id. The court stated, "The question we must decide is not necessarily whether re-
spondent has violated the Clayton Act, but whether a court of equity will lend its aid to
protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it as the effective means of re-
straining competition with its sale of an unpatented article." [emphasis added].
11. Id. at 490. "The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, G.S. Suppiger
Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1941), because it thought that respondent's
use of the patent was not shown to violate § 3 the of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (1980),
as it did not appear that the use of its patent substantially lessened competition or tended
to create a monopoly in salt tablets. We granted certiorari ......
12. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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eventually gave rise to a "super per se rule" for patent misuse.' 3 Thus,
the patent holder was under constraints with which owners of other
property were not burdened. 14
At the same time, the Court and lower courts expanded the appli-
cation of the misuse doctrine to condemn a variety of allegedly restric-
tive licensing practices.' 5 Such categories of licensing practices include
noncompetition covenants, 16 package licensing,17 post-expiration royal-
ties and restraints,i8 royalty based on total sales,19 refusals to license in-
volving excessive or discriminatory licenses,20 territorial limitations,21
field-of-use and customer limitations,22 and grantback licenses.23 Inter-
estingly, courts have not always applied the super per se misuse rule to
all these practices. Rather, their attitude has varied depending on the
category of the practice in question. In general, although courts consist-
ently have applied a super per se rule in striking down tying arrange-
ments, they have been more tolerant of other practices such as
territorial limitations, field-of-use limitations, and grantback licenses.24
The stringent judicial attitude toward restrictive business practices
in patent misuse cases prestaged the bad tide of antitrust illegality per
se.25 The courts began to find tying arrangements involving patents or
copyrights as illegal per se. Consequently, the tying arrangements were
unenforceable even though the anticompetitive impact that resulted
13. J. Diane Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RuTGERS COM. & TECH.
L.J. 357, 390 (1990) (Professor Brinson compared the patent misuse doctrine with anti-
trust rules, and called the patent misuse doctrine a "super per se rule.").
14. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
15. See generally CHISUM, supra note 8, at § 19.04; Brinson, supra note 13; William J.
Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 UCLA L. REV. 76 (1962).
16. See, e.g., National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garret Co., 137 F.2d 255, 58
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 460 (3d Cir. 1943).
17. See, e.g., Sbicca-Del Mac, Inc. v. Milius Shoes Co., 145 F.2d 389, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
249 (8th Cir. 1944).
18. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
19. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
20. See, e.g., Extractol Process, Ltd. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 153 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.
1946).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 n. 6 (1967).
22. See, e.g., General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), on
rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that the de-
fendant could not be guilty of infringement, on the basis of the tying cases.).
23. See, e.g., Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198 (2d
Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
24. The legality of field-of-use limitations and grantback licenses is discussed in more
detail in section III of this Article in connection with Lasercomb's allegedly restrictive
clauses.
25. See generally George H. Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality per se: Forestall-
ing and Patent Misuse, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 170 (1950).
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from the arrangements affected only a small part of trade.26 The courts
also severely limited the scope of antitrust immunity for a patent set
forth by early Supreme Court cases.27
In contrast to the separate standards for patent misuse and anti-
trust violations established in Morton Salt,28 in the mid-forties, some
courts began to use a unified standard. For example, the Mercoid v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.29 court stated that the legality of
tying arrangements should be measured by antitrust laws, not by patent
law. 30 However, the merger of patent-antitrust principles of this period
did not affect patentees advantageously. Many courts in the 1940s and
1950s held that any attempt to expand a patent monopoly outside the
patent grant constituted a per se violation of antitrust laws, practically
without regard for the quantity of trade affected.31 Note that the
courts' reasoning of this period suggests that the real core of antitrust
per se illegality lay in the conduct or means employed to cause a re-
straint. 32 Consequently, courts condemned various patent practices as
per se violations of antitrust laws simply because patents, as opposed to
other business practices, were used to achieve the restraint. In this
view, the willful exclusion of competitors through the extension of a
patent monopoly always constituted a nefarious means of restraining
trade, and thus an antitrust violation and patent misuse per se.3 3
The courts' attack on allegedly restrictive licensing practices
reached a peak when the Neal Commission recommended legislation
that would have required a patentee to license all applicants on
equivalent terms, if it chose to license any.34 In 1975, the Justice De-
partment articulated its principles for handling patent misuse cases.
These became well known as the infamous "nine no-nos.' '35 Wilson's
26. See, e.g., Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
27. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); see also Schueller, supra note 26, at 186.
28. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
29. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
30. Id. at 684.
31. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1974) "[Ilt is
unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any substantial market" by extending
patent monopoly outside the scope of the grant. "The volume of business affected by
these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the
arrangement to the accomplishment of the monopoly seems obvious." Id.; Oxford Varnish
Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
32. FTC v. Fashion Originators Guild, 114 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
33. Id; see also Schueller, supra note 26, at 192.
34. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, THE NEAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT § 5 (1968).
35. Wilson, Law on Licensing Practice; Myth or Reality?, Speech delivered before the
American Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1975).
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criticisms of the nine types of license practices clearly showed the
marked hostility toward restrictive licensing practices.
In the eighties, the American government began to be concerned
more about the competitiveness of American industry in the field of in-
ternational trade than the possibility of one American firm controlling
a domestic market.36 It was thought that stringent enforcement of anti-
trust laws in the area of licensing practices had a harmful effect on the
competitiveness of American industries. Responding to this concern,
the Justice Department discarded its stringent standard for evaluating
licensing restrictions. Additionally, the courts began to show tolerance
of licensing restrictions when they examined allegedly restrictive licens-
ing practices for antitrust violations.3 7 Many courts upheld allegedly re-
strictive business practices that had once been held violative of antitrust
law, which clearly shows the courts' application of a relaxed standard.
For example, in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States,3 8 by exam-
ining the legality of a tying practice that did not involve patent licens-
ing, the Supreme Court refused to apply the well established per se
illegal rule. Instead, it expressly required that the defendant have suffi-
cient economic power in the market of the tying product before con-
demning a tying arrangement.
In contrast, the Court's hostile attitude toward misuse cases in pat-
ent and copyright litigation has changed very little. The Court's up-
holding tying arrangements in non-patent licensing cases contrasts
sharply with their attitude toward those in patent licensing cases. This
shows the gap in antitrust standards between non-patent and patent
cases. In a word, the Court has presumed that the grant of a patent
confers on the patentee significant market power.3 9 Consequently, the
Court has continued to apply the per se illegal test, finding antitrust vio-
lations when the tying arrangement in question was conditioned on a
patent or copyright licensing agreement. This attitude of the Court
seems to result from its reluctance to introduce the complexity entailed
in defining market power and in applying antitrust principles to patent
and copyright litigation. Compared with the task of defining market
power, it is easier and more secure to presume market power and find-
ing a patent misuse. However, as will be explained in the following sec-
36. PAUL S. HOFF, INVENTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE 1 (1986).
37. Id. at 19.
38. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
39. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). The Court also found that
tying arrangements involving patented products are an antitrust violation per se. Id. at 46.
"[S]ince one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness, ... the existence
of a valid patent on the tying product, without more, establishes a distinctiveness suffi-




tions, this practice unfairly discriminates against patentees and leads to
unreasonable results. Considering this aspect of the misuse doctrine,
courts should have read Northern Pacific Railway to require the appli-
cation of the market power threshold test to the misuse doctrine. Even
after the Court, influenced by the Chicago School's analysis on vertical
restrictions, relaxed its rigid application of the per se rule to nonprice
restraints in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,40 courts did not
abandon the super per se rule in patent and copyright litigation.
As for misuse defenses, the Court has also upheld a defendant's
misuse defense in patent infringement cases involving a tying arrange-
ment because the license practice violates antitrust law.41 The Court's
continuing stringent attitude in examining licensing practices when de-
termining antitrust liability also found its way into lower courts' stan-
dards for finding the misuse defense. Therefore, some courts simply
continued to strike down practices that courts recognized as an expan-
sion of a patent monopoly regardless of the licensor's market power or
the efficiency of the practices.42 The above historical analysis clearly
shows that the misuse doctrine has developed inconsistently with anti-
trust principles. Naturally, courts should have made it more difficult
for defendants to make out a misuse defense when they relaxed their
standards for evaluating restrictive licensing practices for antitrust
violations.
B. Two VIEWS OF THE MISUSE DOCTRINE
1. Traditional View of the Misuse Doctrine: Separate Standards for
Misuse Defense and Antitrust Laws
In the intervening 50 years since Morton Salt,43 the courts' analyses
in finding patent or copyright misuse are still inconsistent." While
some courts appear to use antitrust principles and justify condemning
patent or copyright misuse by holding that a patent grant presumes
market power,45 other courts continue to use separate standards for up-
holding a misuse defense and antitrust issues established in Morton
Salt.46 The majority of courts still follow the latter, traditional view -
that patent misuse need not be supported by a showing of an antitrust
violation, and that restrictive licensing practices, being against public
40. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (emphasizing the redeeming purposes and possible beneficial ef-
fect of the arrangement).
41. CHISUM, supra note 8.
42. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
43. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
44. Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Rule of Antitrust Standards
and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1294 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
46. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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policy, render a patent unenforceable. 47 In spite of the significant flaws
of the traditional view that will be discussed in the following subsection,
it does have its own merits.
The thesis in support of the traditional view is that the misuse doc-
trine is based on the patentee's obligation not to use the patent to se-
cure a monopoly beyond the limit of its grant.48 The scope of antitrust
laws extends only to conduct or attempts that monopolize, unreasona-
bly restrain trade, or lessen competition, as they are against the policy
of free competition. In contrast, the scope of the misuse doctrine ex-
tends to any conduct or attempts to expand a patent monopoly because
they are against the public policy under patent law. Such conduct in-
cludes behavior that may not rise to the level of an antitrust violation
but is still worth preventing under other branches of law beside anti-
trust.49 Thus, the traditional view sets a standard for patent misuse
that has developed independent of antitrust principles.
The misuse doctrine originated from the equity doctrine that courts
may withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted
contrary to the public interest.50 This doctrine is not related to anti-
trust remedies. Thus, in the traditional view patent law develops its
own standard for finding a misuse defense.
2. New View: Analyzing Misuse by Antitrust Principles
Responding to this obvious inconsistency among courts, some courts
and commentators began to propose that patent and antitrust misuse
standards be unified. Judge Posner is the best-known supporter of the
new view that unify patent misuse and antitrust liability standards. He
challenged the long-standing view in Morton Salt, and expressly voiced
his opinion that the distinction between patent misuse and antitrust
must be removed. In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,51 the Sev-
enth Circuit found that a differential royalty schedule in a licensing
agreement was not a patent misuse. In analyzing whether the differen-
tial royalty schedule constituted patent misuse, Judge Posner cited
cases that found misuse relying on the traditional view. In dicta, he
47. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140-41
(1960). "[I]f there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse
embodies the ingredient of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of Sherman Act, or that Zenith
was threatened by a violation so as to entitle it to a injunction under § 16 of the Clayton
Act." Id. at 140; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff'd in relevant part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
48. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664 (1944).
49. Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 793, 795 (1988).
50. 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1941).
51. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
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questioned whether the reasoning of these cases accurately character-
ized the economic effect of the practices held to constitute misuse.52
Furthermore, he triggered extensive debate over the unification of the
patent misuse doctrine and antitrust liability by suggesting that the
same standard could be used to find a patent misuse and antitrust
violation. 53
III. ANALYSIS OF LASERCOMB
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds is an interesting case not only
because it involved high-tech products, die-making software, on which
the object of the Reform Act is focused, but also because the appellate
courts employed the traditional per se illegal approach that Congress
tried to remove from misuse cases. Furthermore, the Appellate Court
found that Lasercomb's standard licensing agreement constituted mis-
use because it is against both the policies of free competition and idea
dissemination. The computer industry needs restrictive clauses to pro-
tect trade secrets, however, the court mistook the nature of the licens-
ing practice and struck it down even though it was unlikely to actually
harm the competition. Therefore, the Lasercomb court's conclusion is
not in accord with the spirit of the Patent Misuse Reform Act.
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Lasercomb America. Inc., a software program developer, brought
an action against the president and computer programmer, Reynolds, of
a steel rule die manufacturer (Holiday Steel), alleging copyright in-
fringement and fraud. Lasercomb and Holiday Steel are competitors in
the manufacture of steel rule dies that are used to cut and score paper
and cardboard for molding into boxes and cartons. In 1983, Lasercomb
licensed four copies of its die-making program "Interact" to Holiday
Steel. To aid Holiday Steel's use of the program, Lasercomb sent its
personnel to train Reynolds in Interact's operations and uses. Because
52. Id. at 510-11. The court stated:
As an original matter one might question whether any of these practices really
,extends' the patent. The patentee who insists on limiting the freedom of his pur-
chaser or licensee . . . will have to compensate the purchaser for the restriction
by charging a lower price for the use of the patent.... True, a tie-in can be a
method of price discrimination. It enables the patent misuse owner to vary the
amount he charges for the use of the patent by the intensity of each user's de-
mand for the patent.... But since .... there is no principle that patent owners
may not engage in price discrimination, it is unclear when one form of discrimi-
nation, the tie-in, alone is forbidden.
Id.
53. Id. at 512. The Court stated, "Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of mo-
nopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the pro-
cess subjecting the rights of patents holders to debilitating uncertainty." Id,
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Reynolds received detailed knowledge of Interact's operation, Reynolds
could readily copy the program and create a similar software "PDS-
1000." In 1985, Holiday Steel started to sell the program as its own
CAD/CAM die-making software. When Lasercomb found that PDS-
1000 was almost a direct copy of Interact, it filed this action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
The district court granted a summary judgment for the plaintiff,
finding the defendants liable for copyright infringement. The defend-
ants raised the copyright misuse defense, but the court rejected the mis-
use defense, stating that the clause preventing Lasercomb's licensees
from developing die-making software was reasonable.
On appeal, the defendants did not dispute that they copied Interact,
but raised the misuse defense on the basis of the non-development
clauses in Lasercomb's standard licensing agreement. They did not
claim an antitrust violation. Interestingly, the defendants were not
bound by the agreement, and Lasercomb had never enforced the agree-
ment. To support the misuse defense, the defendants proved that at
least one Interact licensee had entered into the standard agreement.
The standard licensing agreement includes the following allegedly re-
strictive clauses:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not
permit its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to
write, develop, produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1)
year after the termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, de-
velop, produce or sell or assist others in the writing, developing, pro-
ducing or selling computers assisted die making software, directly or
indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent. Any such activ-
ity undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any
warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the
question whether a licensing agreement constitutes copyright misuse
must be decided under the patent law principle. It stated that the dis-
trict court erred in analyzing the licensing agreement under the anti-
trust principle, the "rule of reason." In other words, the Circuit Court
repeated the traditional view of the patent misuse doctrine in Morton
Salt,55 and ruled that the proper test for finding misuse is whether a
patentee used its patent or copyright in a manner that violates the pub-
lic policy embodied in the grant of a copyright regardless of whether
the activity amounts to an antitrust violation. The court found that
54. 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990). "The 'Term in this Agreement' referred to in
these clauses is ninety-nine years." Id
55. 314 U.S. 488 (1971).
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Lasercomb's licensing practice was against public policy,5 and thus up-
held the defendant's misuse defense.
B. PROBLEMS OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE MISUSE DOCTRINE
When applying the patent misuse doctrine on the basis of the tradi-
tional view, courts have depended on ad-hoc analyses for finding mis-
use. The question whether courts can reach a reasonable result depends
on how properly the courts locate the public policy concern and evalu-
ate the nature of each practice and its possible harm to the public policy
in light of the particular facts surrounding the patented invention in
question. Although it is essential that courts make these inquiries in or-
der to reach a reasonable solution, some courts sidestep the complex
evaluation and arrive hastily at the conclusion of misuse by classifying
the practice in question as identical with one of the practices that has
previously been found to constitute misuse. This short-cut analysis
often leads to unreasonable conclusions.
The Lasercomb court's reasoning is a typical example of this short-
cut analysis. It is accompanied by many evils that result from the flexi-
bility of the equity principle. Lasercomb should not have followed the
traditional view, because the traditional view is outdated and defective
in many aspects.
First, the traditional view is flawed because it rests on the incorrect
premise that the ownership of a patent constitutes an automatic signifi-
cant market power and results in anticompetitive effect.57 The premise
that the policy of patent law conflicts with that of antitrust law is also
incorrect. On the contrary, the patent policy harmonizes antitrust pol-
icy.58 The fundamental purpose is to promote the consumer's welfare.
Patent law achieves this goal by encouraging innovative competition in
the development of new products and processes. Antitrust law achieves
the same goal by protecting price competition. In the long run, techno-
logical progress contributes far more to consumer welfare than does the
elimination of allocative inefficiencies caused by noncompetitive pric-
ing.59 Treating patentees more harshly under antitrust law than non-
patentees is unreasonable. Any conduct permissible under antitrust
laws for firms which have obtained significant market power through
non-patent business practices also should be permissible for firms that
have obtained market power through exercising patent rights. Thus,
56. 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990).
57. L. Peter Farkas, Can A Patent Still Be Misused?, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 677 (1991).
58. Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse Con-
straints on the Exportation of Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 487 (1984).
59. MARKHAM, CONCENTRATION: A STIMULANT OR RETARDANT TO INNOVATION?, IN
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 247, 253-54 (H. Goldsmith, H. Mann &
J. Weston ed. 1974).
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antitrust laws should control a licensing practice only when the practice
selected by the patentee results in actual harm to the competition. As
long as no actual harm occurs, the licensing practice is in perfect com-
pliance with the public policy common to patent and antitrust laws.
Second, the traditional view should be removed because it deprives
patentees of any argument for preventing courts from applying the mis-
use doctrine. The old view requires courts to continue to strike down
licensing practices that are similar to a once-struck-down practice. In
spite of the significant effect, the traditional misuse doctrine entails no
general principle or standard for deciding the legality of licensing prac-
tices. Such uncertainty in standards unnecessarily suppresses the pat-
entee's effort to start new beneficial licensing practices. The typical
analytic practice of the courts is to classify the licensing practice in issue
as one of the practices that courts have already declared misuse.
Although courts explain the relevant public policy underlying the mis-
use doctrine to justify its application, they seldom examine the actual
harm with respect to the public policy concerned, nor do they explain
how much harm is required to constitute misuse. By failing to provide
any principle or standard, courts prevent patentees from relying on any
ground for their arguments. In short, the courts' current practice is un-
fair to patentees.
Third, it is likely that the traditional misuse doctrine is contrary to
not only patent law policy but also antitrust law policy. Classifying a
practice without examining the harm to the relevant public policy often
leads to a misunderstanding of the nature of the practice. Conditions in
allegedly restrictive license agreements vary from one another. Each
agreement causes a different impact on competition and relates to a dif-
ferent public policy depending on the market circumstances and the na-
ture of the patented invention. Courts striking down a license practice
may forever render unusable a business practice that effectively im-
proves social welfare without resulting in any anticompetitive impact.
This is clearly against antitrust and patent policies.60
Fourth, the traditional per se misuse doctrine was established over
50 years ago. Consequently, it does not include any considerations re-
quired for business practices involving transferring high-technology. It
seems quite natural for the high-tech industry to complain that the
traditional approach is outdated.61 Courts have ignored an important
function of licensing practices, namely, permitting others to enter into
the market of a patented product. A grant of a license with a restric-
60. See generally Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in
Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (1984); Frank H.
Eastbrook, The Limit of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984).
61. S. Rep. No. 492, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (Aug. 25, 1988).
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tive clause encourages competition more than no grant of a license.
Granting a patent or copyright license often accompanies a transfer of
trade secrets. Under the per se illegal rule, a patentee must run the risk
that inclusion of restrictive clauses to protect such trade secrets may
constitute misuse. Thus, it is highly possible that the courts' harsh
treatment of restrictive license practices discourages patentees from
granting a license to competitors.
Finally, the courts' presumption of market power resulting from
the ownership of a patent or copyright is clearly erroneous. Courts
have been focusing on the imaginary power that is supposed to be cre-
ated by a grant of a patent. Unfortunately, it is no longer true that a
patent always confers upon its owner a significant market power.
There once was a time when inventors of new products, such as
Edison's lamp, could enjoy a patent monopoly for their inventive genius.
Today, however, one product, such as the CD player, is protected by
hundreds of patents owned by different patentees. A patentee is un-
likely to obtain market power through only one patent. In truth, a pat-
entee can hardly recover costs of investment.62 Thus, in the current
circumstances, the expected benefits of a patent monopoly do not moti-
vate firms to take the effort to develop inventions. Rather, they are
forced to do so simply because their business would otherwise be con-
fined to the exclusive rights conferred by competitors' patents.
Furthermore, even if a patentee obtains market power based on a
patent for a distinguished product, it is very difficult to maintain that
market power because competitors start to develop improvements by
using information disclosed in the patent. When competitors obtain pat-
ents for the improvements, the patentee cannot use the improvements
without infringing the competitors' patents.63 To use the improve-
ments, the patentee inevitably grants a cross-license with the competi-
tors, resulting in less market power. In short, the courts' per se misuse
rule is not in accord with the real circumstances of current American
industries.
Only few commentators expressed their belief in maintaining the
traditional view of misuse.64 One commentator argues that the doctrine
62. But see, Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1984) (The patent reward/monopoly loss ratio that Professor Kaplow
used for his analysis is based on a presupposition that a patentee can receive a reward by a
patent monopoly. However, in competitive market such as the electronics industry, no
company has a market power to control a price for a product even though every one of
them has a number of patents. They are urged to invent so that they can have patents,
the number and quality of which are good enough to get cross-licenses with their
competitors.).
63. DONALD S. CHISUM, ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAw § 4100 (1987).
64. Merges, supra note 49, at 798.
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of misuse is based on the equitable principle of unclean hands and gives
courts a flexibility to avoid an unreasonable result when a valid patent
monopoly is enforced.65 However, the equity doctrine of unclean hands
is an ancient rule that stems from pure ethics and is hardly separable
from morals.66 The fact that today's courts seldom apply this doctrine
other than in misuse cases indicates that this doctrine is outdated in the
modern legal practice. Undoubtedly, it is in all respects outdated when
applied to intellectual property that handles most of the advanced high
technology transfer. To make matters worse, this doctrine inevitably
introduces uncertainty in the results of cases.6 7 The uncertainty is what
Congress intended to remove from the existing misuse doctrine. Ac-
cordingly, the enactment of the Reform Act by Congress to clarify the
standards for finding the misuse defense should be interpreted to mean
that the time has come to abandon the ancient rule of unclean hands.
The same commentator also argues that the misuse doctrine, with
its origins in equity is an important weapon for challengers, and thus
must be maintained as a counterbalance to the doctrine of equivalents
which is a pro-patentee weapon based on the equity doctrine.6 8 How-
ever, this argument does not make sense. There is no nexus between
the doctrine of equivalents and the misuse doctrine. Equity is achieved
when the range of equivalents is decided so that the interests of chal-
lengers and patentees are balanced. To determine the range of
equivalents, courts never consider whether the patentee conducted any
practice that may constitute misuse.
American trade policy also limits the scope of finding a misuse de-
fense. In the GATT Uruguay Round,69 the United States established
the minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property
rights.70 Since no other country has a system equivalent to the misuse
65. Id. at 796-97.
66. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH.
L. REV. 876, 1065 (1949).
67. Merges, supra note 49, at 798. (Prof. Merges himself stated that the equitable doc-
trine is messy because of the unclear boundary of the doctrine.)
68. Id.
69. Opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS (1969); see generally JOHN HOWARD JACKSON, JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS &
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984); OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE
GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985).
70. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4
INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. Framework Proposal]; Sug-
gestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objectives, reprinted in 11 IIC
Studies, 189 (1989); EC and Japan Presents Intellectual Property Proposal for Uragauy
Round Negotiations, 4 INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 1499 (Dec. 2, 1987); Guidelines Proposed
by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
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doctrine developed by American courts, American patent protection, in
particular, its enforcement standard, does not satisfy the minimum stan-
dard. Courts ignored an important policy of the United States - that all
compulsory licenses should be abolished. 71 The misuse doctrine permits
infringers to use a patented invention unless the patentee stops engag-
ing in the practice constituting misuse. In other words, allowing the
misuse defense constitutes a type of compulsory license during the pe-
riod of the patentee's misuse. Moreover, maintaining the misuse doc-
trine is possibly harmful to American industry. For example, if an
infringer is a foreign corporation, courts become a party to the theft of
valuable commodities in the United States by declaring a patent of an
American company unenforceable. Such a practice is clearly against the
United States trade policy.
C. 1988 PATENT MISUSE REFORM ACT
Since Lasercomb was filed before the enactment of the 1988 Patent
Misuse Reform Act, the Act is not applicable.72 However, when Con-
gress shows a direction to guide courts by enacting a new Act, courts
should not ignore the direction. Technically, the Lasercomb court's ap-
plication of the old law that follows the traditional view of the misuse
doctrine is not error. However, if Lasercomb properly interpreted Con-
gress' direction underlying the enactment of the new Act and applied
new laws in accord with the spirit of the new Act, it could have reached
a more reasonable result.
1. Legislative History
The Reagan Antitrust Division made great efforts in reevaluating
the intellectual property protection to find a more rational approach to
the licensing arrangements.7 3 The creation of new technology is essen-
tial to strengthen the competitiveness of American industry in the in-
ternational market.74  In response to courts' and commentators'
criticism of the majority of courts' adoption of the traditional view,
Congress decided to clarify the standard for finding misuse. In the 99th
Property Rights, reprinted in 11 IIC studies, 203 (1989); EC Presents Detailed Proposal for
GATT Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 1012 (July 13,
1988).
71. U S. Framework Proposal, supra note 70.
72. The Act applies to cases filed after 1988.
73. Garza, A Rational Approach to Regulate the Development and Exploitation of
Technology: The Justice Department Perspective, 45 PLI/PAT 217, PLI Order No. G4-3807
(1988). Congress' effort to reform patent misuse standard started in 1982 in response to
increased emphasis on U. S. competitiveness in the world economy. See generally, HOFF,
supra note 36.
74. HOFF, supra note 36.
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Congress two bills75 were introduced that proposed that all license
agreements be analyzed using antitrust principles.7 6 To clarify and
limit the patent misuse doctrine, the proposed provision of 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 listed practices that constituted misuse, and allowed a finding of
misuse only when the practices violated the antitrust laws. Under the
proposed provision, there would be no such thing as a per se violation of
the antitrust law. Indeed, courts would apply only the rule of reason in
determining the legality of license agreements under antitrust laws.77
After several misuse reform bills were discussed, the United States
Senate passed a bill that was a predecessor to the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act.7 8 The purpose of this law was (1) to clarify the treatment
of intellectual property rights under the antitrust laws by prohibiting
courts from assuming market power only because of the existence of a
patent or copyright; and (2) to reform the doctrine of patent misuse so
it would not be used to restrict the rights of patent owners when their
licensing practices do not violate the antitrust laws.79 In short, the bill
included two schemes: 1) eliminate the presumption of a patentee's
market power in patent misuse cases;80 and 2) evaluate license practices
involving intellectual property under the same antitrust principles that
are applied to practices involving other forms of property.8 ' Thus, this
bill8 2 was clearly in line with the new view expressed by Judge Posner
in USM Corp.83 and would have overruled existing Supreme Court
precedent.8 4
75. H.R. 4585 and H.R. 4808, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
76. Alan H. MacPherson, Recent Patent Misuse Legislation, 270 PLI/PAT 285, PLI
Order No. G4-3830 (1989).
77. Id. "The administration emphasized that a new section 282 (b) would not in any
way alter existing law with respect to whether or when the conduct it specifies violate[s]
the antitrust laws. It is intended to deal exclusively with the evaluation of such conduct
under the patent misuse doctrine." Id.
78. Pub. L. No. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674 (H.R. 4972).
79. S. Rep. No. 492, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Aug. 25, 1988).
80. Id.
81. S. Rep. No. 492, supra note 79, at 12.
82. According to the bill, the new § 271 (d) would provide:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices or actions
or inactions relating to his or her patent, unless such practices or actions or inac-
tions, in view of the circumstances in which such practices or actions, or inactions
are employed, violate the antitrust laws.
Id.
83. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)
(Market power may be presumed from ownership of a patent if the buyer cannot buy the
product elsewhere.); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969).
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On October 20, 1988, the House examined the bill, and amended it
to limit the practices to which this new standard would apply to two sit-
uations, namely, refusal to license, and tie-in and package license ar-
rangements. The amended bill required that a challenger prove the
market power of the patentee, rather than all the elements of an anti-
trust violation for a finding of misuse. As a result, the amended § 271
provides:
d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the following:
(4) refused to license or use any right to the patent;8 5 or
(5) conditioned to license or use any rights to the patent or the sale
of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in an-
other patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale
is conditioned.
According to Senator DeConcini,8 6 Congress' intent in enacting the
Reform Act was to move away from a per se approach used in the past
by the courts in applying patent misuse principles to tying arrange-
ments and to establish a market power threshold test to precede any
misuse finding involving tying. Senator DeConcini also explained that
even if the defendant in a patent infringement action proves that the
patent owner has market power, this does not automatically mean that
the court will find that the patent owner has misused the patent. In
other words, the patentee can avoid misuse by arguing the pro-competi-
tive benefit of the arrangement. Furthermore, Senator DeConcini ex-
pressed his expectation that this revision would lead to the reevaluation
of the licensing arrangements and move courts' analyses of the arrange-
ments to the rule of reason approach.8 7 He also suggested that the new
Act is only a part of the misuse reform scheme.8 8 Although he believed
that Congress would continue to make an effort to reform the standards
85. The provisions for refusals to license reflects case law. Even before the enact-
ment of the Reform Act, refusals to license did not constitute an antitrust violation nor
patent misuse. See, e.g. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). Thus, this article will focus on the interpretation of the provi-
sions regarding tie-in and package license arrangements.
86. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17146 (Oct. 21, 1988).
87. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17147 (Oct. 21, 1988). Statement of Senator DeConcini: "This
will constitute the heart of this misuse rule-of-reason analysis, but as I indicated above, it
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of misuse,89 no such report has been reported since the Act was
enacted.
2. Impact on the Existing Case Law
As the legislative history clearly shows, a per se approach relying
on the presumption of the patentee's market power may no longer be
taken in cases involving tie-in and package license arrangements.90
Under the Patent Misuse Reform Act, a challenger who raises a misuse
defense must show that the patentee has market power in the relevant
market. Congress avoided defining the term "market power" so that
courts can assess the potential effect of a particular practice.9 ' It also
did not specify what level of market power would be sufficient for a
finding of misuse. It expected the courts to use the same principles that
are established in antitrust cases.92 Congress thoroughly evaluated the
market power theory in antitrust law. It follows from this fact that
when Congress used the term "market power," it intended for courts to
require challengers to show that a patentee's market power was suffi-
cient to affect prices in the market, as is required under antitrust law.
Congress' intent is that in applying the market threshold test, where a
patent license is involved, courts should evaluate the question of "mar-
ket power" in the context of the patent, the product, and the market in
which the tie-in occurs.9 3
Use of the term "relevant market" indicates that the courts must
pay attention to the nature of the patent when the scope of the product
is defined.94 Congress stated that the scope would be coextensive with
the patent if the patented product is unique and no practical substitutes
exist.95 The problem that Congress did not address and which courts
must deal with in cases is the difficulty in defining substitutes. For ex-
ample, each wireless telephone available has unique functions, but still
one can be a substitute for another. Since there is no alternative test in
determining substitutes, courts cannot help but use the tests established
in antitrust cases96 such as the substitute product test for defining the
89. Id,
90. 134 Cong. Rec. H. 10648 (Oct. 20, 1988). Statement of Rep. Kastenmeier: "The un-
derlying principle being advanced by his proposal is the elimination of any vestiges of a
per se or automatic inference of patent misuse from certain tying practices." Id.
91. 1I
92. Id.; 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17148 (Oct. 21, 1988). Statement of Senator Leahy: "We
would therefore expect any 'market power' determination made for patent misuse pur-
poses to be the same as that used with respect to an antitrust matter relating to the same
factual circumstances." Id.
93. 1i
94. 134 Cong. Rec. H. 10648 (Oct. 20, 1988).
95. Id,
96. The legislative record suggests that Congress intended to use antitrust principles
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relevant market product definition in the Department of Justice's
Merger Guidelines.97
Consequently, the new limitations inevitably introduce a complex
economic evaluation. The argument that the "relevant market" analy-
sis is difficult and misleading has significant merit.98 Antitrust law and
economics scholars have been trying to clarify "relevant market" for a
century.99 Some antitrust scholars of the Chicago School proposed a
process to evaluate market power without defining relevant market,
although the effectiveness of this process is doubtful. 10°
In response to the assertion that it is too difficult to define relevant
market, the argument can be made that the difficulty itself cannot jus-
tify the uncertainty in the misuse standard. It may be that imposing the
burden of proof on the challengers makes it difficult for them to suc-
ceed in making out a misuse defense. Considering the fact that the
Constitution imposes on Congress a specific obligation to protect patents
and copyrights, the judicial attitude that shifts the burden to a patentee
by presuming a market power is against the public policy underlying
patent and copyright. Since challengers, in the first place, willfully or
negligently infringe a constitutionally protected property right, they
must be the parties who bare the burden of proving the patentee's often
difficult-to-define market power.
Other difficulties exist which are unique to patent and copyright li-
censing practices. These include the difficulty of determining the rele-
vant market of a process patent, in particular, a manufacturing process
that can be used to produce products that belong to different industries,
and the difficulty of defining the relevant product when the patent cov-
ers only a small part of a product. Take, for example, a patent covering
a memory circuit that minimizes the area occupied by the circuit. If
there is no other circuit as small as the circuit that can provide the
same function, the circuit itself is unique and has no substitute. How-
ever, the IC using the circuit may have many substitutes that are as
small as the IC and can provide the same operations as the IC because
the size of the IC can be minimized through other technology such as
to apply the market power threshold test in the Reform Act. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17148 (Oct.
21, 1988). "[T]he term 'market power' is used in the provision on misuse in no new or
unique way. Congress is definitely not attempting to create a definition or usage of the
term by statute that would bind courts in either patent misuse or antitrust litigation." Id.
97. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES, pub-
lished June 14, 1984, reprinted in WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS, III, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 560 (1985).
98. Merges, supra note 49, at 802.
99. Eastbrook, supra note 60; Phillip Areeda, Market Definition and Horizontal Re-
straints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 553 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981).
100. Eastbrook, supra note 60, at 23.
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an arrangement of circuits. Considering the realities of the market-
place, the market power of a patented product or process can hardly be
evaluated without evaluating related patents and patented products.
Difficulty also exists in cases involving a product that is covered by a
number of patents owned by competitors. These questions are all left
for courts to resolve.
In spite of these difficulties, the advantage of the new limitation of
the misuse doctrine exceeds the possible complexity. The advantage of
adding the market power threshold limitation is to provide concrete
grounds on which patentees can defend the legality of their licensing
practice. The new rule alleviates much of the patentees' fear that a new
licensing practice might constitute patent misuse. The unclear standard
of the traditional misuse doctrine unreasonably restricts patentees' busi-
ness activities. 101 Much attention must be paid to the possibility that
the past stringent judicial attitude has eliminated a variety of pro-com-
petition licensing practices. Considering the importance of maintaining
the competitive power of American industries in international trade,
the risk of rendering an efficient business practice forever ineffectual is
much higher than the risk of overlooking uncertain but possibly an-
ticompetitive practices. 10 2
It is not clear what the term "in view of the circumstances" means.
The legislative history suggests that the phrase "in view of the circum-
stances" was added to give the courts the flexibility to exercise their eq-
uitable powers.' 03 In particular, Senator DeConcini expressly noted
that even if the defendant in a patent infringement action proves that
the patent owner has market power, the patent owner may still argue
that any substantial anticompetitive impact of the tie-in is outweighed
by benefits of the licensing arrangement.1 4
Despite Senator DeConcini's belief, he cannot change the fact that
the new language of § 271 (d) does not explicitly require courts to apply
the rule of reason analysis of antitrust laws. Thus, it is not clear that
the revision directs courts to use the rule of reason analysis in deter-
mining patent misuse. Courts need not follow Senator DeConcini's
view. They are free to interpret the terms "market power" and "in
view of circumstances." However, it should be noted that these terms
in the new Reform Act correspond to the factors that courts must ex-
amine for finding antitrust liability under the rule of reason. It follows
that courts should infer from these terms that Congress intended them
101. Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act, 1987: Hearing on S 438 before the
Subcommittees on Technology and the Law and Antitrus Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
102. Eastbrook, supra note 60.
103. 134 Cong. Rec. H. 10648 (Oct. 20, 1988).
104. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17147 (Oct. 21, 1988).
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to adopt the rule of reason analysis. In short, Congress adopted the rule
of reason analysis for finding patent misuse. The reason that Congress
did not use the terms "rule of reason" is to avoid ambiguity involved in
defining the analysis. Congress adopted the term "market power" and
"market circumstance" to directly list the factors to be used in the "rule
of reason" analysis.
Congress also made a sensible choice in requiring proponents of the
misuse defense to make the threshold showing of the patentee's market
power rather than prove all the elements of an antitrust violation. In
general, antitrust plaintiffs must show actual injury to competition in
the relevant market and antitrust injury flowing from the particular
conduct.10 5 It seems reasonable to require only a showing of the paten-
tee's market power because without market power, the patentee cannot
affect competition in the relevant market.1° 6 This is because the doc-
trine of patent misuse makes a patent unenforceable, but does not allow
defendants (alleged infringers of patents) to obtain antitrust remedies.
If the new Reform Act had required the infringer to show a nexus be-
tween injury and conduct as is required under antitrust laws, it would
have imposed an unwarranted burden on an infringer. As established
by common law, the alleged infringer need only show that the alleged
restrictive practice relates to the patent at issue.10 7 Thus, Congress bal-
anced the interests between a patentee and an alleged infringer by re-
moving a part of the burden of proof required under antitrust laws and
made it easier for an alleged infringer to raise a misuse defense.
In conclusion, even though the language in the new provision in-
volves many ambiguities, one thing is clear. Tie-in and package licens-
ing agreements will no longer automatically constitute patent misuse.
Under the new § 271 (d), courts must consider patentees' market power
and the particular circumstances of the market in the patented
products.
D. APPLICATION OF THE NEW LAW TO LASERCOMB
1. Applicability of the New Limitations to Lasercomb's Licensing
Practice
Literally interpreted, the market power limitations in the Patent
Misuse Reform Act do not apply to licensing arrangements other than
tie-in and package licensing. It follows that the new limitation does not
apply to Lasercomb's licensing agreement. However, the application of
the limitations should extend to all licensing practices.
105. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
106. Eastbrook, supra note 60.
107. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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The misuse reform scheme in the original Senate bill 438 was appli-
cable to all license arrangements, 0 8 but the version which passed was
limited to tie-in and package licensing arrangements on the process.
The elimination of other arrangements from the misuse reform scheme
was not intended to prevent courts from using the same principles in
determining whether other licensing arrangements constitute misuse.
As Senator Leahy's statement indicates, Congress' goal for the Misuse
Patent Reform Act is to move the misuse standard for all license ar-
rangements toward a more flexible, fact-oriented approach.10 9
There are other reasons to justify the extension of the new limita-
tions. First, the underlying public policy of free competition is common
to tie-in and package licensing practices and other practices. Congress
has adopted the principle that a practice is unlawful only when a patent
holder has market power;" 0 this principle must apply to all licensing
practices. All licensing practices held to constitute misuse can trace
their origin to the court's application of the misuse doctrine in Morton
Salt"' which involved a tying licensing practice. Focusing on the com-
mon underlying public policy, courts did not distinguish one licensing
practice from another when they extended the misuse doctrine to strike
down new forms of licensing practices.112 Clearly, no reasonable excuse
exists to distinguish tie-in and package license arrangements from other
arrangements when Congress set up the new standard for evaluating
the legality of a licensing practice.
Second, courts had adopted the rule of reason test in analyzing li-
censing practices other than tying and package licensing even before
the enactment of the Reform Act, although they did not expressly use
the phrase "rule of reason" to describe their analyses. Compared with
tie-in and package licensing practices, the judicial attitude toward other
practices has been a relaxed one. Many courts declared some of these
licensing practices legal per se,11s or seldom found others to constitute
108. S. Rep. No. 492, supra note 79.
109. 134 Cong. Rec. S. 17147 (Oct. 21, 1988). Senate Leahy stated: "While this approach
is indeed different from our original patent misuse proposal, it does not mean that Con-
gress has rejected the earlier Senate Proposal and now believes that the traditional mis-
use doctrine should be retained intact in the many other areas in which it may be applied
by courts." Id.
110. See Eastbrook, supra note 60, at 17; see also HOFF, supra note 36.
111. 314 U.S. 488 (1941).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942) "The partic-
ular form or method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended is immaterial." Id.;
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 696 (D.S.C. 1977). "Patent mis-
use . . . occurs when there is an attempt to extend the patent beyond the scope of its
claims. The manner in which the monopoly of the patent is sought to be extended is not
material." Id.
113. See, e.g., Selchow & Righter Co., v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
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patent nisuse.114 Congress' silence on other license practices implies its
acquiescence to the courts' attitude.
Third, this relaxed judicial attitude clearly shows that these licens-
ing practices result in less anticompetitive impact than tie-in and pack-
age licensing practices. Therefore, if courts maintain the per se rule of
the traditional misuse doctrine, they will use a more stringent standard
to evaluate less anticompetitive practices than tie-in practices, which is
clearly unreasonable. As a result, the market power limitation in the
Patent Misuse Reform Act should apply in determining the legality of
all licensing practices.
In Lasercomb, the license practice provided a very small impact on
the competition because the scope of the agreement was limited to com-
puter assisted die-making software and licensees can freely develop and
sell other types of software. The new limitations should have prevented
the court from finding misuse.
In particular, the new limitations should have applied to
Lasercomb, because the Lasercomb court might have rendered forever
ineffectual a harmless business practice that is necessary for the
software development industry. This is what Congress wanted to avoid
most by enacting the Misuse Reform Act. An important factor the
court failed to recognize is that the scope of copyright protection for
computer software is unclear. Application of the substantial similarity
test 15 that is well established with respect to traditional copyrightable
subject matter is also difficult in the area of computer software.11 6
Thus, restrictive clauses such as the one in Lasercomb's licensing agree-
ment are necessary to effectively prevent licensees from infringing the
licensed copyright in unlicensed fields. Covenants that are generally
called "field of use" licenses1 7 are widely used to prevent licensees
from infringing outside their grant of license. For example, Lasercomb
(Grant of an exclusive license under design patent was held to be lawful); United States v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), off'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1965)
(Provisions restricting the quantity of patented articles produced were held to be lawful);
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (Field of use restriction was held to be lawful).
114. See, e.g. Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith CO., 329 U.S. 637 (1947)
(Assignment type grantbacks are held not to be illegal per se); Magnavox Co. v. Mattel,
Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 28 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (A patentee is not required to offer licenses to
all competitors on equal terms.). But see, Motorola, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l., Inc., 601 F.
Supp. 62 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (A patent misuse defense is upheld even though misuse pertained
to a discriminatory license scheme was not yet executed).
115. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir,
1986); see generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (Supp. 1991).
116. Duncan M. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software 47 U. Prrr. L. REV.
1037, 1085 (1986).
117. RAYMOND C. NORDHAUS, PATENT AND ANTITRusT § 44 (1977).
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has never granted a license to develop a derivative work from its
software. Within the scope of the original copyright, Lasercomb is free
to grant or refuse a license to develop a derivative work. Courts regard
these types of agreements to be within the scope of a copyright grant.118
An important factor in protecting computer software is the diffi-
culty in effectively preventing infringement. Because the level of origi-
nality that renders revised software a separate copyright is not clear, it
is difficult to identify whether a modification is within the scope of
copyright for the original software. As Lasercomb illustrates, copyright
owners face the risk that their licensees may modify the licensed
software and start to sell the revised version, alleging its own copyright
independent from the copyright of the original software. The most ef-
fective way to prevent this type of infringement is to forbid licensees
from developing and selling any software designed for the same use.
The allegedly restrictive clauses were likely to be ancillary for protect-
ing Lasercomb's copyright, and also legally permissible since the restric-
tion covers only software having the same use.
Restrictive clauses such as those in Lasercomb are also necessary
for protecting trade secrets transferred with a grant of copyright li-
cense. As Lasercomb suggested, a grant of copyright license alone
hardly enables licensees to use the licensed software. In many cases, a
licensee requests its licensor to send personnel to train the licensee's
employees. Naturally, providing training accompanies a transfer of val-
uable knowledge and trade secrets. Developing and revising software
inevitably involves unauthorized use of this knowledge and trade
secrets. Unrestricted granting of a license may lead to the disclosure of
knowledge and trade secrets, resulting in loss of trade secret protection.
In order to protect trade secrets transferred with a grant of copyright,
the restrictive clause preventing licensees from developing and selling
the same type of software are ancillary to computer licensing agree-
ments. In summary, by ignoring these business necessities in the high-
tech industry, the Lasercomb court reached a conclusion contrary to
Congress' intention in enacting the Patent Misuse Reform Act.
Finally, the circuit court's analysis is inconsistent with precedents
in that it did not construe the alleged restrictive clauses to cover
software within the scope of copyright. Judicial attitude toward "field
of use" restrictions has never been stringent. Even though courts may
find a "field of use" license unlawful,1 19 they do not automatically find
misuse. Rather, they tend to construe the restrictive clauses so that
they are within the scope of the grant. For example, in Campbell v.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
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Mueller,120 a misuse defense was raised by the alleged infringers in a
patent infringement suit involving a patent relating to a feather-picking
apparatus for fowl. The patentee granted its licensees the right to man-
ufacture, use and sell the manually operated apparatus, but prohibited
its licensee from making or selling both the patented and unpatented
automatic apparatus. The court dismissed the misuse defense, constru-
ing the license as restricting the licensee from making or selling only
the automatic apparatus covered by the patent. Similarly, in Reliance
Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Jiffy Products,121 the lower court upheld the le-
gality of a license agreement whose scope of grant was restricted to the
specific construction exemplified by a sample trainer and blueprints. A
similar interpretation could have applied to Lasercomb. That is, the cir-
cuit court could have construed the allegedly restrictive clauses as re-
stricting the licensee from developing and producing revised die-making
software within the scope of the licensed copyright. Under this inter-
pretation, the restrictive clauses would clearly have been in the scope of
the original copyright. Thus, even under the traditional misuse doc-
trine, the court should have upheld the standard licensing agreement.
This erroneous result caused by the ad-hoc analysis is also the one Con-
gress intended to prevent by enacting the Reform Act.
2. Applicability of Market Power Limitations to Copyright Cases
Since, unlike patent misuse cases, cases in which courts have up-
held copyright misuse defenses are very few. Whether the patent mis-
use defense applies to copyright cases is questionable. The Lasercomb
court answered this question affirmatively, relying on the similarity of
rationales underlying patent and copyright laws.l"2 In particular, the
court looked into the historical perspectives of copyright and patent
laws and found that the public policy underlying these laws is essen-
tially the same.12 3 The philosophy behind copyright law is to encourage
the efforts of authors and introduce new ideas and knowledge into the
public domain. This philosophy is parallel to that of patent law.
The Lasercomb court's analysis is generally correct in that the pat-
ent misuse doctrine can extend to copyright cases given the idea dissem-
ination policy that is common to copyright and patent laws. However, it
is flawed because the court extended the patent misuse doctrine to
copyright, but did not extend the limitations for the misuse doctrine.
Even though the extension of the new misuse standard to copyright
120. 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947); see also Pet, Inc. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 404 F. Supp.
1252 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
121. 215 F. Supp. 402 (D.N.J. 1963).
122. Id. at 973.
123. Id. at 974-75.
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cases was also deleted from the enacted Reform Act,1?4 careful theoreti-
cal considerations require courts to extend the same limitations to copy-
right cases.
First, the underlying public policy of copyright law is common to
patent law. Because of this, courts did not distinguish copyright licens-
ing practices from patent licensing practices when they extended the
patent misuse doctrine to copyright cases. Thus, it would be unreasona-
ble for courts to distinguish copyright misuse from patent misuse when
they evaluate the legality of licensing practices.
Second, the anticompetitive effect resulting from copyright is, at
least in theory, less than that of patent. 125 It is unreasonable to apply
the market power threshold test to limit patent misuse but not to limit
copyright misuse, which is less likely to harm competition. The exclu-
sive right conferred by copyright is not as complete as that of a patent.
A copyright can exclude others from using a copyrighted work only if
that work directly or indirectly derives from the copyrighted work.126
In contrast, a patent right can exclude anyone from making, using and
selling a patented product or process even though he or she indepen-
dently invented the same product or process.12 7 Furthermore, the fair
use defense broadly limits copyright protection. 128 The new copyright
law also imposes compulsory licensing schemes for various types of
works.129 The scope of copyright protection is also different from that
of patent. Since copyright protects expression, not the underlying
idea,130 the scope of copyright is smaller than that of patent. Moreover,
copyright is infringed only if the accused infringer's work is substan-
tially similar to the copyrighted work in the expression. It follows that
a copyright presumes less impact on competition in the relevant
market.
Third, the extension of the new limitations to copyright cases
would be advantageous because the market threshold test effectively
functions to measure the actual harm resulting from an allegedly re-
strictive copyright licensing practice. Subject matter of copyright has
more variety than that of patent.' 3 ' The market power conferred by
124. S. Rep. No. 492, supra note 79.
125. Glen P. Belvis, Computers, Copyright & Tying Agreements: An Argument for the
Abandonment of the Presumption of Market Power, 28 B.C. L. REV. 265 (1987).
126. DONALD S. CHISUM & WALDBAUM, ACQUIRING AND PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS § 4.02 (1985); EDWARD E. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGU-
LATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 615 (1991).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
129. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115-16, 118 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1992).
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copyright significantly varies depending on the type of subject matter.
For example, the market power conferred by a copyright for software is
different from a copyright for films or literary works. The market
power threshold test effectively prohibits only licensing practices that
cause an actual harm to the competition. This is a reasonable protec-
tion. In conclusion, a reasonable interpretation of the enactment of the
Patent Misuse Reform Act naturally leads to the extension of the new
limitations to copyright cases.
Furthermore, the Lasercomb court's analysis is irrational. The
Lasercomb court did not pay attention to the copyright owner's market
power or other market conditions. Since the monopolistic power result-
ing from a grant of patent or copyright is a justification for imposing on
a patentee a duty to use its patent or copyright in compliance with pub-
lic policy,'3 2 the competitive impact is the essential factor in evaluating
the legality of a licensing practice. Accordingly, the circuit court's reli-
ance on M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen 133 in upholding the defendant's
misuse defense in Lasercomb is erroneous; the Jensen copyright owner's
market power and particular market circumstance were far different
from those of Lasercomb. Jensen involved a blanket licensing agree-
ment for a music composition. Usually ownership of a copyright for one
musical composition does not confer on the owner any power to affect
the competition. But there is no doubt that in Jensen, the copyright
owner, ASCAP, had a significant market power.' 34 ASCAP's pooling of
a significant share of copyrighted musical compositions constituted a
special market circumstance and conferred on ASCAP a monopoly
power. In contrast, in Lasercomb, since neither the trial court nor the
circuit court mentioned in their opinion Lasercomb's market power in
the market of die-making software, it is not clear how much market
power Lasercomb had. At the least it is clear that there were no special
market circumstances such as in Jensen. It would also be very difficult
for Lasercomb to obtain and maintain significant market power in the
software market because software development does not require a big
investment. A skilled computer engineer can readily enter the market.
Additionally, Lasercomb's licensing agreement only partially restrained
trade because the licensee has many options other than entering into
Lasercomb's standard licensing agreement. Using the new limitation-
132. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488, 492-94. "The grant to the inventor of the special privi-
lege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adapted by the Constitution and laws
of the United States... Id. at 492. The court, however, does not aid the patentee when
he illegally expands his patent monopoly beyond the granted scope. See id. at 494.
133. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
134. Id. at 846. "It is uncontradicted that on an average at least 80% of the music inte-
grated in sound films is copyrighted and owned by members of ASCAP and the licensing
exclusively controlled by ASCAP." Id.
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the market power threshold test and market circumstance considera-
tion-the court could have properly evaluated these differences.
3. Relevance of Policies Other Than Free Competition to the Misuse
Doctrine
The circuit court pointed out the possibility that the allegedly re-
strictive clauses would have dampened creative abilities of defend-
ants. 135 In determining the legality of the allegedly restrictive clause,
the Lasercomb court was concerned with the public policy of dissemi-
nating ideas and promoting innovation. It decided that Lasercomb at-
tempted to use its copyright in a manner against the public policy.
However, the court's analysis is inconsistent with precedent and is not
in accord with the spirit of the Patent Reform Act.
The Patent Misuse Reform Act does not address the question of
whether the innovation promoting policy alone cannot support a finding
of patent or copyright misuse. However, precedent indicates that the
answer should be no. Grantback license cases well indicate courts' atti-
tudes to forward the innovation promoting policy.' 3 6 Despite the sup-
pressing effect of assignment type grantback licensing practices, courts
have found that the grantback practices are not per se illegal. 137 No
court has ever held that a grantback clause alone constitutes an anti-
trust violation.1 38 Only few courts found license practices involving
grantback clauses in violation of antitrust laws.139 These facts also indi-
cate the courts' relaxed attitudes. The few courts that have found such
licensing practices illegal did not focus on the idea dissemination policy,
but focused on the effect of patent pooling, emphasizing the predatory
nature of patent owners who used their basic patents to maintain their
dominant position in the market of the patented product.' 4
0
135. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (1990).
136. A grantback clause requires the licensee to grant back to the licensor patent
rights which the licensee may develop or acquire. There are two types of grantback
licenses: one requires licensees to grantback exclusive licenses for improvement; the other
requires licensees to grantback nonexclusive licenses for improvements. See generally
CHISUM, supra note 8, § 19.04 (3).
137. Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (the
Court reasoned that the use of one legal monopoly to acquire another is proper and distin-
guishable from an extension of a patent monopoly to encompass unpatented goods as in a
tie-in).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio
1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The exclusive grantback provision did not by itself vio-
late the antitrust laws; only in connection with the other illegal practices were the
grantbacks "integral parts of the general scheme to suppress trade." Id. at 309.
139. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
140. 82 F. Supp. 753, 815-16; 80 F. Supp. 989, 1005-06; see also Transparent Wrap Mach.
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1947). "Conceivably the device could be
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The Lasercomb court's analysis is also inconsistent with precedent,
as it did not examine whether the licensees who entered into the re-
strictive licensing contract were in fact discouraged.141 If the licensee in
the first place did not have any facilities or will to develop software, it
would be impossible to discourage its development efforts. Thus, it is
likely that the allegedly restrictive clauses did not have any adverse ef-
fect on the innovation promoting policy.
Furthermore, the Lasercomb court's conclusion may actually have
an adverse impact on the innovation-promoting policy because refusal
to protect valuable software would significantly discourage Lasercomb
and other software developers from development.
The goals of the Reform Act-the clarification of the misuse stan-
dard-also indicate that policy other than that of free competition alone
cannot constitute misuse. Namely, the enactment of the new act gave
courts the duty to remove the seeds of uncertainty. In the past, courts
have considered public policies other than free competition on an ad-
hoc basis, which inevitably introduced uncertainty. The addition of the
market power requirement means that Congress chose certainty in re-
sult over a reasonable result in each particular case. Congress' implicit
intent is to endorse Judge Posner's proposal of unifying antitrust and
patent misuse standards.142 Accordingly, courts should not consider
public policies other than free competition in determining the legality
of a licensing practice. Congress' efforts would have been wasted if the
Reform Act allowed courts to manipulate the nexus between public pol-
icy and the licensing practice to find misuse.
One commentator strongly opposed Judge Posner's view, explain-
ing the need to maintain the equity-based misuse doctrine by using an
example in which public policy other than free competition requires
that a patent be held unenforceable. 14s He used an example of a paten-
tee of an AIDS vaccine to show the need for courts to take into account
background facts and maintain equitable flexibility.
This argument is unsound. First, his misuse theory encourages the
attitude that patent misuse is whatever the judge says against some
public policy, which gives courts unlimited power to grant compulsory
employed with the purpose or effect of violating the antitrust laws.... Competitors might
be eliminated and an industrial monopoly perfected and maintained. Through the use of
patent pools and multiple licensing agreements the fruits of invention of an entire indus-
try might be systematically funneled into the hands of the original patentee." Id.
141. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 673 (D.S.C. 1977). The
Duplan court denied the misuse defense, finding that "[the licensee's] research and devel-
opment efforts were not stifled by the grantback arrangement." Id. at 672.
142. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 645
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
143. Merges, supra note 49, at 796.
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licenses. Such a practice introduces not only great uncertainty in patent
enforcement, but also is likely to be contrary to American trade policy,
resulting in detrimental effects on American industry. 144 Furthermore,
as the commentator admitted, an exceptional case such as the one he
used as an example is very rare. Removing the uncertainty from a pat-
entee's business strategy is more important than doing justice in such
exceptional cases. Even though some urgent circumstances may require
a patent to be held unenforceable, the courts are not a suitable forum to
discuss the problems. Since intellectual property has come to have a
great significance in American trade, Congress must be the one to set
the standard. Now, Congress has taken charge by providing a statutory
limitation to clarify the scope of the courts' discretion to allow such
compulsory licenses. Courts must refrain from overriding Congress' au-
thority.145 Without Congress' clear authorization, courts should not use
any public policy as an excuse to strip the patentee of important prop-
erty rights.
Second, as for the misuse doctrine, there is no public policy other
than that of free competition that is important enough to render a pat-
ent unenforceable. Some may argue against this view by focusing on
the constitutionally acknowledged public policy of promoting the dis-
semination of ideas.146 However, this argument is not persuasive be-
cause it presupposes an undue importance of the idea dissemination
public policy. This argument is flawed because it fails to recognize the
fact that courts have never struck down a licensing practice simply be-
cause the practice prevents ideas from being disseminated to the public.
If the Patent Clause in the Constitution renders the idea dissemination
policy of such great importance, it is unreasonable that Congress has
dropped the publication requirement for obtaining copyright protec-
tion147 and courts found trade secret protection permissible outside of
the scope of patent and copyright laws.148 Moreover, this argument is
also flawed because it fails to recognize the pro-idea dissemination as-
pect of all licensing practices. Any licensing practices, regardless of the
content of restrictive covenants, promotes the dissemination of ideas,
because a grant of license allows the transfer of ideas from a patentee to
its licensees. In short, these arguments cannot justify the significant
uncertainty that would result if courts are allowed to conclude that cer-
144. See U.S. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL, supra note 70.
145. Other countries' patent laws provide for compulsory licenses for public interest.
See, e.g., Japanese patent law, Articles, 83, 92, and 93.
146. Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards
and First Amendment Value, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (1988); see generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 4.01[A] (Supp. 1990).
148. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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tain licensing practices constitute misuse because they are against a pol-
icy other than that of free competition.
IV. Conclusion
The interplay between patent and antitrust law created the tradi-
tional misuse doctrine and expanded the application of the doctrine to
various types of licensing practices. Considering both the needs in the
high-tech industry and competition with other countries, the traditional
misuse doctrine is outdated and no longer functions as it did when it
was developed. The Lasercomb court's opinion illustrates that it is often
difficult for courts to reach reasonable and uniform conclusions under
the traditional misuse doctrine that reflects the ancient myth of histori-
cal equity. In particular, the traditional misuse doctrine leads to harsh
results to patent owners, and to an unclear standard that constrains the
business practices of patent and copyright owners.
The enactment of the Patent Misuse Reform Act is the result of
Congress' effort to make the courts aware of these problems and act on
their own discretion to adjust the principles to the reality in the market
place. The new limitations provided in the Patent Misuse Reform Act
effectively removed these problems. However, the scope of the new
limitation is not perfectly clear and too narrow. The application of the
new standard to other practices not only in patent cases but also in
copyright cases proposed in this Article resonates with the courts' atti-
tudes toward patent license practices in the antitrust context, and is es-
sentially in harmony with any patent principles. Accordingly, courts
should expand the scope of the new limitations to attain Congress' goals
and establish a new era of common law in patent and copyright misuse.
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